---

Managing relationships across organizational boundaries has become as much an art as it is a science. Over time, the increasing complexity of supply chains and the interdependence of global markets have transformed simple exchanges into deeply layered networks of cooperation and control. What was once centered around transactions and contractual obligations has now involved into a subtle interplay of trust, commitment, and shared purpose. Consequently, understanding how these social and governance mechanisms interact is no longer a niche academic interest; rather, it has become a central question for firms seeking to remain resilient and competitive in volatile markets.

To begin with, managing business relationships are a critical component of supplier relationship management (Christopher, 2022). It’s built through interactions between actors, and is one of many determinants of measuring the overall business success or failure (Lambert & Cooper, 2000; Monczka, 2021).

Moreover, the complexity among these relationships, however, varies due to their different structures ranging from transactional to long-term strategic partnerships (Cox, 2001; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Krause, Handfield, & Tyler, 2007). This makes research in this area both diverse and holistic (Cai, Yang, & Hu, 2009; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Dyer, Singh, & Hesterly, 2018; Tangpong, Hung, & Ro, 2010; Tangpong, Michalisin, Traub, & Melcher, 2015).

The main themes of many studies as such can be summarized into two groups: transactional (contractual/discrete), or relational (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Heide, 1994; Heide & John, 1990; Jap & Anderson, 2003; Liu, Luo, & Liu, 2009; Macneil, 1982; Poppo & Zenger, 2002), These segregation represents two different but interrelated spectrums (Cao & Lumineau, 2015). As a result, scholars have explored different levels and units of analysis within these relationships (Fryxell, Dooley, & Vryza, 2002; Li, Xie, Teo, & Peng, 2010).

Accordingly, the first group of studies focusing on the essence of transactional mechanisms not only in the  market level but within contractual relations (Riordan & Williamson, 1985; Williamson, 1985), which has been widely studied. Transactional relationships are formal systems that manage exchanges between firms and individuals which are constructed based on legal contracts and economic incentives (Liu et al., 2009).

In contrast, the second group, on the other hand, emphasizes on relational characteristics of relationships as such, emphasizing on the essence of long-term relationship management and therefore, prioritizing the subjective social norms in the their research (Brito & Miguel, 2017; Cheung, Myers, & Mentzer, 2011; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Poppo & Zenger, 2002).

In contrast to the contractual relationships’ characterized by (1) nonspecific asset investments, (2) low information exchange (i.e., prices centric behavior where the coordination and information sharing between buyer and supplier is centered and signaled through the price mechanism), (3) distinguishable technological and functional systems within each firm, that are characterized by low levels of interdependence (i.e., the two organizations have only a sales-to-purchasing interface and do not jointly create new products through multifunctional interfaces), and (4) low transaction costs and minimal investment in governance mechanisms (Riordan & Williamson, 1985), the relational aspect of inter-firm relationship is seen dissimilar (Dyer & Singh, 1998).

Relational relationships emphasize on the role of routines and resource-based metrics that direct firms towards joint value creation (Dyer, 1996; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Dyer et al., 2018). BSR forms provides various platforms _transactional and/or relational_ for exchanges between firms, leading to different relationship outcomes. Therefore, the main objective of this research is to explore whether relationship competencies, such as trust (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Poppo & Zenger, 2002) , influence BSR forms and outcome measures.  

Ultimately, the dilemma between social constructs and governance mechanisms in business relationship management reflects a broader tension between efficiency and empathy in organizational life. Contracts may structure exchanges, but it is the quality of human interaction — trust, reciprocity, and shared norms — that sustains them over time. As business environments continue to evolve, firms that learn to balance these forces, integrating formal governance with genuine relational competence, will be better positioned to innovate and adapt. Managing relationships, therefore, is not just about control or compliance; it is about cultivating the kind of understanding that allows collaboration to thrive beyond the boundaries of the firm.

Reference

Brito, R. P., & Miguel, P. L. (2017). Power, governance, and value in collaboration: Differences between buyer and supplier perspectives. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 53(2), 61–87.

Cai, S., Yang, Z., & Hu, Z. (2009). Exploring the governance mechanisms of quasi-integration in buyer–supplier relationships. Journal of Business Research, 62(6), 660–666.

Cao, Z., & Lumineau, F. (2015). Revisiting the interplay between contractual and relational governance: A qualitative and meta-analytic investigation. Journal of Operations Management, 33, 15–42.

Cheung, M. S., Myers, M. B., & Mentzer, J. T. (2011). The value of relational learning in global buyer–supplier exchanges: A dyadic perspective and test of the pie-sharing premise. Strategic Management Journal, 32(10), 1061–1082.

Christopher, M. (2022). Logistics and supply chain management. Pearson UK.

Cox, A. (2001). Understanding buyer and supplier power: A framework for procurement and supply competence. Journal of Supply Chain Management, 37(2), 8.

Dyer, J. H. (1996). Specialized supplier networks as a source of competitive advantage: Evidence from the auto industry. Strategic Management Journal, 17(4), 271–291.

Dyer, J. H., & Chu, W. (2003). The role of trustworthiness in reducing transaction costs and improving performance: Empirical evidence from the United States, Japan, and Korea. Organization Science, 14(1), 57–68.

Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(4), 660–679.

Dyer, J. H., Singh, H., & Hesterly, W. S. (2018). The relational view revisited: A dynamic perspective on value creation and value capture. Strategic Management Journal, 39(12), 3140–3162.

Fryxell, G. E., Dooley, R. S., & Vryza, M. (2002). After the ink dries: The interaction of trust and control in US-based international joint ventures. Journal of Management Studies, 39(6), 865–886.

Heide, J. B. (1994). Interorganizational governance in marketing channels. Journal of Marketing, 58(1), 71–85.

Heide, J. B., & John, G. (1990). Alliances in industrial purchasing: The determinants of joint action in buyer–supplier relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 27(1), 24–36.

Jap, S. D., & Anderson, E. (2003). Safeguarding interorganizational performance and continuity under ex post opportunism. Management Science, 49(12), 1684–1701.

Krause, D. R., Handfield, R. B., & Tyler, B. B. (2007). The relationships between supplier development, commitment, social capital accumulation and performance improvement. Journal of Operations Management, 25(2), 528–545.

Lambert, D. M., & Cooper, M. C. (2000). Issues in supply chain management. Industrial Marketing Management, 29(1), 65–83.

Li, Y., Xie, E., Teo, H.-H., & Peng, M. W. (2010). Formal control and social control in domestic and international buyer–supplier relationships. Journal of Operations Management, 28(4), 333–344.

Liu, Y., Luo, Y., & Liu, T. (2009). Governing buyer–supplier relationships through transactional and relational mechanisms: Evidence from China. Journal of Operations Management, 27(4), 294–309.

Macneil, I. R. (1982). The new social contract: An inquiry into modern contractual relations. Ethics, 93(1).

Monczka, R. M., Handfield, R. B., Giunipero, L. C., & Patterson, J. L. (2021). Purchasing & supply chain management. Cengage Learning.

Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (2002). Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23(8), 707–725.

Riordan, M. H., & Williamson, O. E. (1985). Asset specificity and economic organization. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 3(4), 365–378.

Tangpong, C., Hung, K.-T., & Ro, Y. K. (2010). The interaction effect of relational norms and agent cooperativeness on opportunism in buyer–supplier relationships. Journal of Operations Management, 28(5), 398–414.

Tangpong, C., Michalisin, M. D., Traub, R. D., & Melcher, A. J. (2015). A review of buyer–supplier relationship typologies: Progress, problems, and future directions. Journal of Business & Industrial Marketing, 30(2), 153–170.

Williamson, O. E. (1985). The economic institutions of capitalism: Firms, markets, relational contracting. Springer.